I would like to see the protests in Iran cause real change. But the young people rioting are just that – young people rioting. This is not a second 1979 (the year when the Shah was thrown out), even if it should turn to be a trial run for such a thing. The country is too divided, and, despite what I see on most news sites, it’s not divided the way people think it is. In particular, I have read scores of comments by excited people who think Mousavi is a liberal reformer, and Ahmadinejad is a crazy arch-conservative. Our labels don’t apply in Iranian politics, but if they did, that comparison might need to be reversed.

A part of Ahmadinejad’s appeal is that he is strongly opposed to the fat-cat mentality that has set in over three decades of entrenched privilege for Iran’s ruling class – as opposed to the entrenched privileges of the other ruling class, which was kicked out in 1979, and now has its favoured spokesmen serving as some of the ‘Iranian experts’ on western TV. His provocative jabs about this corruption during the campaign tackled what has been a no-go zone in public discourse in Iran: that is, the wealth of senior religious figures and, most specifically, the wealth of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani. It was Rafsanjani, a former President and omnipresent power-broker, that he beat four years ago. And Rafsanjani backed Mousavi heavily this time out.

Looking at footage of all the angry, desperate people who have thronged the streets and open spaces of Tehran and other cities in the past two days, I have to remind myself their loyalties are varied. Mousavi’s policies in fact reflected very few of their aspirations, but since he reflected some of them, the city voters backed him.

Mostly.

But Ahmadinejad, while his strength is in rural Iran, the ‘old’ Iran, still has enormous strength among urban-dwellers. The Reformists who came to power in the late 1990s under President Khatami (it’s hard to keep your Ks straight in Iranian politics, but he’s the gently smiling guy who was the liberal-minded leader from 1996 to 2004) were as adept at feathering their own nests as the clergy, and that didn’t sit well with the have-nots. Their affection for Ahmadinejad, a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s and someone who genuinely seems to have no need for frills in his life (just check out his wardrobe), is strong. They, most likely, are the people joining the throngs in the counter-demonstrations.

We can’t and shouldn’t excuse the crackdown on the protesters, though it is a normal response in Iran, and has been for centuries without interruption. The Shi’ite tradition of martyrdom runs deep there; also, there have always been people more than willing to create new martyrs in brutal ways.

But we need to know what we’re watching. The riots and demonstrations represent genuine unrest and dissatisfaction over a whole range of issues. These might range from small personal freedoms such as women’s desire to end harassment by patrols checking their clothing or make-up, to anger over imprisoned or persecuted friends and relatives, or ideological rejection of the entire apparatus of the Islamic state. Though the latter only applies to a very small percentage of people. Equally, the reaction against the demonstrators, from the counter-demonstrations through to the police and para-military Basiji’s efforts to break up the groups in the streets, can represent an equal desire to end corruption and effect genuine reforms in the country. The only certainty is that no-one is going to be demanding that Iran give up its nuclear option, or grant basic human rights once more to the Baha’i religious minority.

In the past day or so, I’ve seen people compare the situation in Tehran to Tiananmen Square in 1989, or the collapse of East Germany and the Berlin Wall. The passion of the reactions in Iran is admirable, and it’s possible some genuine changes will come about to prevent a more organised movement starting up. More likely, it will all blow over by Friday, and the status quo will resume.

In which case, despite the million sneers currently to be read on ten thousand blogs and news websites about ‘undemocratic’ Iran, it might be worth remembering that the bulk of Iranians did vote their consciences, and chose to return the incumbent. Just as a minority – admittedly, huge in actual numbers – equally voted their consciences, and can’t come to terms with the fact their man lost.